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Abstract 
Women’s access to and enjoyment of human rights is increasingly being used as a 
global measure of other ‘goods’ in societies, for instance as a measure of 
development, a gauge of the health and depth of democracy and as a general 
indicator of a state commitment and adherence to international responsibilities. 
Therefore, while the study of women’s relationship to human rights is of considerable 
importance and interest in itself it is also gaining prominence across a range of other 
areas of international and domestic law. This might be viewed as a positive indication 
of the growing strength of women’s human rights norms but it bears closer analysis. 
Also, a question remains as to what rights norms are being globalised and how this is 
occurring within the discourse on women’s rights.  
 
This paper considers how apparently universalist rhetorics around equality rights can 
advance ‘orientalist’ and patriarchal discourses in relation to who ‘women’ are and 
how their rights may be realised. Such discourses may hinder implementation of 
women’s rights, especially for women who are ‘other.’ This is particularly evident in 
relation to women’s rights to freedom of expression, the manifestation of religious 
freedom and rights to participate in culture. Therefore, specific focus is given to the 
increasing discrimination against Muslim women and on human rights responses in 
this context within Europe.  
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I - Introduction 
 
Sixty years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and following hard 
campaigning by women’s groups, women’s rights appear to have become popular 
currency. Women’s access to and enjoyment of human rights are increasingly being 
used as global measures of other ‘goods’ in societies, for instance as a measure of 
development,1 a gauge of the health and depth of democracy2 and as a general 
indicator of state commitment and adherence to international responsibilities.3 The 
apparent mainstreaming of concern with gender might be viewed as a positive 
indication of the growing strength of women’s human rights norms, but it bears closer 
analysis. Discourses around women’s rights are now being generated in institutions by 
jurists and policy makers who do not demonstrate a rigorous feminist analysis in 
relation to equality. Is the focus on women’s autonomy and enjoyment of human 
rights as goods in themselves or rather as generators of income or progenitors of 
modernity?4 Even within feminist movements, considerable debate occurs around 
understandings of equality and the questions of what approaches should be adopted 
for the realisation of women’s rights. In this climate, when there is no clear 
consensus, what discourses around women’s rights norms are being globalised and 
what is their impact?  
 
This paper offers some reflections on the way that human rights discourses may in 
effect advance and support orientalist and patriarchal discourses in relation to who 
‘women’ are and how their rights may be realised. In particular, it illustrates how 
jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (and other Council of 
Europe) institutions has fostered orientalist discourses which are detrimental to 
women. This is particularly clear in relation to the freedom to manifest religion. In a 
global context there has been less attention paid to freedom of religion compared with 
                                                 
1
  See, e.g. World Bank, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources 
and Voice (2001)World Bank Washington,1; Genevieve Painter, ‘Linking Women’s Rights and 
MDG’s: An Agenda for 2005 from the Gender and Development Network’(2005) 13 (1)Gender and 
Development 79..  
2
  See, e.g. Zo Randriamo, ‘African Women Challenging Neo-Liberal Economic Orthodoxy: The 
Conception and Mission of the GERA Programme’(2003) 11(1) Gender and Development 44.  
3
  See, e.g. DFID (Department for International Development), Realising Rights for Poor People 
(2000), DFID,  London.13; World Bank, above n1. 
4
  See, Painter, above n1.  
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other human rights and civil liberties and the role of freedom of religion in ‘conflicts 
and maintaining political order’ has been comparatively neglected.5 Despite this 
relative lack of attention clear gender differences can be seen in the way that this right 
is discussed and applied. When claimed by women, ‘freedom to manifest religion’ has 
become a locus for conflicting feminist positions and clashing rights discourses and 
these claims provide a useful illustration of the failure to apply women’s rights to all 
women in a context of dominant Western cultural norms.  
 
 
The next section (II) of this article defines the theoretical basis of the paper and 
explores the conflicts and intersections between globalisation, orientalism or neo-
orientalism and feminism. Section  III considers the history of Article 9 adjudication 
in the Council of Europe rights system and analyses Leyla Sahin v Turkey,6 a case 
which exemplifies the problems of orientalism in human rights discourses. Section IV 
both locates the Sahin decision within the wider human rights framework provided by 
non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and international bodies and provides an 
analysis which goes beyond jurisprudential issues to show the consequences of rights 
discourses on women’s rights as lived experience.  Section V offers some conclusions 
from this discussion.  
 
 
II - Globalisation, Feminism And Orientalism    
 
This section explores the interrelationship between the globalisation of women’s 
rights, feminism, and orientalism in rights discourse. Orientalism can be described as 
a set of discourses which present the Orient in negative terms and as ‘other’ in relation 
to the West. From the 17th Century there was a particular curiosity about Islam and 
the East in Europe, in the 18th and 19th Centuries study became increasingly hostile.7 
Although discourses were generated by a variety of different media, literature, art and 
                                                 
5
  Paul Marshall, ‘Religious Freedom’ in Liam Gearon (ed.) Human Rights and Religion: A Reader. 
(2002) Sussex Academic Press, Brighton. 356. 
6
  Leyla Sahin v Turkey (Application no 44774/98) to Grand Chamber Strasbourg at 10 January 2006, 
http://portal.coe.ge/downloads/Judgments/LEYLA SAHIN v TURKEY.pdf 
7
  Ann Thompson, Barbary and Enlightenment: European Attitudes Towards the Maghreb in the 
Eighteenth Century (1987) Brill,  Leiden. 
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other disciplines, the discourses share an ‘intellectual authority over the orient within 
Western culture’8 and they tend to portray Islam as backward, alien and monolithic.  
 
This historical construction of the identity of the East (particularly the Middle East) 
and Islam is itself a variant of  binary colonial discourse which systematically 
conditioned knowledge and understandings of non-Western peoples as ‘other’ and 
inferior, against a positive construction of the West. These binary colonial discourses 
had a particular fascination with the treatment of women in other societies. Both the 
greater independence of women in some non-Western societies and any indications of 
the supposed low status of women in these other societies were seen as indications of 
that society’s pre-modern barbarism.9  When applied to women orientalist 
perspectives portrayed them in non-Western cultures as victims situated within 
monolithic social structures hostile and oppressive to women10 on the one hand whilst 
on the other as being dangerously erotic,11 threatening carriers of a culture which is 
‘other.’     
  
In debates about the nature of globalised rights movements, distinctions are 
sometimes drawn between economic globalisation with a neo-imperial ideology and 
the concept of globalisation as being a purely technical process descriptive of the 
increasing ease with which people can contact one another across the world. While it 
has frequently been argued that the former model of globalisation has been harmful to 
women,12 it is also argued that the latter processes are of benefit in developing a solid 
                                                 
8
  Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (1978), Penguin, London.19. 
9
  See, for instance, Gregory Massell, 'Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional 
Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia' (1968) 2, Law and Society Review 179 for a discussion of this 
in the soviet imperial context and for the British colonial context; Ann McClintock, An Imperial 
Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (1994) Routledge, London; Clare 
Midgely, (ed) Gender and Imperialism (1998) Manchester University Press, Manchester; Clare 
Midgely, ‘ British Women, Women’s Rights and Empire, 1790 –1850’ in Patricia Grimshaw, Katie 
Holmes and Marilyn Lake, Women’s Rights and Human Rights in International Historical Perspective 
(2001) Palgrave, Basingstoke. 
10
  Ratna  Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the Politics of Postcolonialism (2005) Glasshouse Press, 
London.     
11
  Meyda Yeğenoğlu, Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism (1998) 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge. 
12
   Josephine Kerr and Caroline Sweetman, ‘Editorial,’ (2003) 11 (1) Gender and Development  3-12, 
4; Nilufer, Cagaty, ‘Gender Budgets and Beyond: Feminist Fiscal Policy in the Context of 
Globalisation’ (2003) 2:1 Gender and Development: Women Reinventing Globalisation 15, 24. 
Conversely Naila Kabeer is critical of a portrayal of women only as victims of economic globalisation 
and argues for more complex analysis of the impact of global processes which take into the specific 
contexts and agency of women. See Naila Kabeer, ‘Globalisation, Labour Standards, And Women’s 
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international movement for women’s rights linking women all over the world.13 De 
Souza Santos14 and Kerr and Sweetman15 suggest that a clear dualism exists within 
globalisation practices: on one hand a neo-liberal or corporate-led globalisation and 
on the other globalisations which are bottom up and counter-hegemonic, or rights 
led.16   
 
Sceptical of any distinct dualism in globalisation processes, Richard Falk17 sees a 
‘creative tension’ within international law. He argues that, on one hand international 
law can be viewed as the ‘legal conception of a global normative order’ and as such it 
acts as an ‘instrument for the orientalist domination and exploitation of non-Western 
peoples of the world.’18 Yet, he states, that, contemporaneously, international law may 
also be viewed as:  
 
...a fragile yet indispensable, humanist enclave, which although embedded in realist 
and imperialist geopolitical behaviour provides the normative foundations for 
resistance against and emancipation from contemporary forms of imperialism.19  
 
By phrasing it this way Falk makes it clear that we cannot completely distinguish so- 
called good or bad globalisations by the supposed purposes of the law or of global 
movements. Even human rights law and movements may be used to further 
domination and exploitation. Accepting that there can be such problems with rights 
discourses is not to deny the value of rights rhetoric and norms per se, but rather to 
insist that we interrogate the use and nature of rights discourses wherever they take 
place. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Rights: Dilemmas of Collective (In)Action In An Interdependent World’ 2004 10(1) Feminist 
Economics 3. 
13
  Kerr and Sweetman, above n12.                                                                                                                                                   
14
   Bonaventura De Souza Santos and Cesar a. Rodriguez-Garavito, Law and Globalisation from 
Below, Towards Cosmopolitan Legality (2005) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
15
  Kerr and Sweetman, above n 12.                                                                                                                                                                             
16
  A given illustration of a movement within this model is the World Social forum which De Sousa 
Santos and Rodriguez argue is driven by the twin conceptions of equality and respect for diversity. See 
above n 14. 
17
  Richard Falk, ‘Orientalism and International Law: A Matter of Contemporary Urgency’ (2004) 7 (1-
2) The Arab World Geographer 103. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Ibid. 
 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice (2009) Vol 4, pp 34-73 
That rights may be used by dominant groups against political minorities is a persistent 
theme in the feminist critique of human rights.20 Emphasis has tended to be on the 
presentation of false claims of universalism which exclude women’s experience.  
Feminists have highlighted the problem of individual rights claims by men and 
corporate rights claims by political or cultural groups which take precedence over, and 
are used to defeat, competing rights claims by women. Much Western feminist 
scholarship has been devoted to discussion and consciousness-raising in order that 
harms to women are not ignored or left out of rights frameworks in the name of 
deference to culture.21  
 
Debate within the feminist movement may initially have been driven by the 
perception of ‘an uncritical consensus in relation to multiculturalism’22 and the very 
real difficulties of asserting women’s rights as human rights. Ann Stewart recently 
suggested that ‘legal feminism has largely moved beyond dichotomous debates such 
as those relating to universalism and relativism. We now have a much greater 
understanding of the way in which legal discourses contribute to the construction of 
identities.’23 Yet the way some international women’s movements, dominated by 
Western feminists, still frame campaigns and use law suggests that the feminist 
movement is not yet beyond neo-colonialism and orientalism.24 There may be greater 
awareness within the feminist movement of post-colonial critiques around women’s 
rights discourse, but false universals in relation to the position of women continue to 
be presented.25 These presentations lead to an inability to grasp the complexity of 
meanings in the lives of women who are different or ‘other’ and hide the reality of 
rights breaches against women who are ‘othered’ within the category of women.26   
 
                                                 
20
  Katherine Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender 
(1991) Westview Press, Boulder. 
21
  See the discussions by Susan Moller Okin, ‘Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions.’ 
(1998)108 (4). Ethics 661; and Eva Brems, ‘Enemies or Allies?: Feminism and Cultural Relativism as 
Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse’ (1997) 19(1) Human Rights Quarterly 136.  
22
  Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (2008) Princeton University Press, Woodstock,2. 
23
  Ann Stewart, 'Globalising Gender Justice?'(2007) 1 Law, Social Justice & Global Development 
Journal (LGD) http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/stewart LGD 2007 (1) - Stewart 
at 1 October 2008. 
24
  Kapur, above n10.   
25
  Ibid and see also Chandra Talpade Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses’(1984) 12 (3) Boundary 333. 
26
  This paradox in women’s rights discourse is what Ratna Kapur calls a logic of ‘justification of 
exclusion through liberalism.’ Kapur, above n 10.  
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In relation to orientalism and women’s rights, Roksama Bahramitash27 suggests that 
we can identify two positions: ‘feminist orientalism’ where orientalists use women’s 
rights to legitimise neo-colonialist policies without necessarily having any concern for 
feminist positions, and ‘orientalist feminism’, where genuinely feminist discourses are 
presented in such a way that they support orientalist discourses.28 The distinction 
Bahramitash draws is useful because it shows the need to approach this in two ways; 
firstly that there is a need to expand the debate within feminism, secondly that 
irrespective of any need to broaden the debate feminists must urgently address the fact 
that ‘outside of feminist circles, principles of gender equality [are] being deployed as 
part of a demonisation of minority cultural groups’29 from which women are not 
exempt.   
  
The invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 provides an illustration of both feminist 
orientalist and orientalist feminist positions identified by Bahramitash. A number of 
women’s groups, for instance the Revolutionary Afghanistan Women’s Association 
(RAWA) and Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML), had been campaigning 
for years to raise the profile of women’s rights breaches under the Taliban.30 Yet it 
was not until the events of 9/11 that concerns with women’s rights breaches were 
apparently ‘mainstreamed’ in the foreign policy of the UK and USA. This is a clear 
example of ‘feminist orientalism’. For while women’s rights were held up as a 
justification for military intervention,31 there was actually little consideration of 
women’s security in the course of the invasion and the subsequent occupation has 
                                                 
27
  Roksana Bahramitash, ‘The War on Terror, Feminist Orientalism and Orientalist Feminism: Case 
Studies of Two North American Bestsellers’(2005) 14:2 Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 221. 
28
  Charlotte Weber, ‘Unveiling Scheherazade: Feminist Orientalism in the International Alliance of 
Women, 1911-1950’ (2001) 27:1 Feminist Studies  125,127 suggests the term ‘Feminist Orientalist’ 
originates with Joyce Zonana in ‘The Sultan and the Slave: Feminist Orientalism and the Structure of 
Jayne Eyre’ in Clark et al (ed.) Revising the Word and the World (1993) University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
29
  Phillips, above n 22 at 2. Islam particularly has come under attack in international law and Western 
domestic policies in the later 20th Century and especially post 9/11 period. See for instance William 
Lafi Youmans, ‘Edward Said and Legal Scholarship’ 2004) 107 3 UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near 
Eastern Law 1; Jean Allain, ‘Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East as the Underclass of 
the international Order’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal Of International Law 391; Falk, above n 17. 
30
  Also under previous Western and Soviet backed governments in Afghanistan.  
31
  Jan Jindy Petmann calls these, ‘Rights of Convenience.’ See Jan Jindy Pettman, ‘Global Politics and 
Transnational Feminisms,’ in Luciana Ricciutelli, Angela Miles and Margaret McFadden Feminist 
Politics, Activism and Vision: Local and Global Challenges, ed.( 2005) Zed Books, London and New 
York 49–63.  
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shown little substantial concern for women.32 Further, in what has proved to be an 
unwise alliance, many Western feminists who had campaigned against the Taliban 
supported the invasion - their position could be described as ‘feminist orientalist’. 
Neither RAWA nor WLUML supported the invasion and are still campaigning 
against the occupation.  
 
Another illustration of both feminist orientalist and orientalist feminist positions 
comes from the academic Sherene Razack who argues that whatever the substantive 
issues for debate in Canada around Sharia law there is a problem with the way the 
debate has been framed: 
 
“Canadian feminists (both Muslim and Non-Muslim) have ‘utilized frameworks that 
installed a secular/religious divide that functions as a colour line, marking the 
difference between the white , modern, enlightened West, and people of colour, and in 
particular, Muslims.”33 
 
Neo-orientalism in women’s rights discourse around Islam causes a number of 
problems at both a practical and theoretical level. From her work on the presentation 
of asylum claims and rights to refuge, Susan Akram has identified three principle 
ways that harm is caused.34 Firstly that stereotyping actually ‘supports and promotes 
the most repressive and extreme versions of Islamic interpretation’ because it allows 
fundamentalist regimes who manipulate such interpretation to ‘further distance Islam 
from universal human rights.’35 Secondly, by dividing promoters of human rights in 
the Islamic world from their counterparts in the West, it diminishes the potential of 
feminist and rights movements.  Thirdly by privileging certain ‘Western feminist’ 
interpretations of rights breaches above more local understandings of the nature of 
those breaches, it may deny women the best expertise and reduce protection.  While it 
                                                 
32
  See the Amnesty International Report  ‘Afghanistan’ No One Listens To Us And No One Treats Us 
Like Human Beings: Justice Denied to Women’ 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA11/023/2003  at August  2007 which charts a worsening in 
some cases. 
33
  Sherene Razack, ‘The ‘Sharia Law’ Debate In Ontario: The Modernity/ Premodernity Distinction in 
Legal Efforts to Protect Women from Culture’ (2007) 15 Feminist Legal Studies 3, 6. 
34
  Susan Mussarat Akram, S. M, ‘Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims’ 2000) 12 
International Journal of Refugee Law 7, 9. 
35
  Ibid 9.  Although Akram discusses this in the context of Islam the critiques could equally be applied 
to neo-orientalist discourse around any other culture or religion.  
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is always necessary to take into account the context of rights breaches, orientalism  
‘fetishises’ or ‘eroticises’ some harms to women and through this different treatment 
together with the development of a ‘rhetoric of victimisation’ women may be denied 
agency and a voice.36    
 
Rather than just failing to adequately protect women, such approaches may actually 
imperil or thwart implementation of human rights norms. An example of problematic 
strategy is what Ali Tripp calls the international interventionist ‘rescue’ paradigm.  
Tripp argues that international groups sometimes intervene at a local level over the 
head of a local NGO even where the women at a local level specifically ask that they 
be left to direct resources and action.37  Such exoticising or fetishising of the role of 
the ‘other’ in relation to rights breaches tends to shift attention away from the wider 
geopolitics of inequality within national and international systems38 and may frustrate 
internal solutions by presenting culture or religion as insurmountable barriers to 
equality for women in these contexts.39  By failing to recognise an intersectional 
approach to discrimination it sometimes seems that women who are ‘other’ must first 
be separated from their religion and culture before they can be the  
recipients of equality.40  
 
In this context the autonomy of the actual woman becomes a mute point.  For 
example, Susan Akram details the reluctance of refugee advocates to present asylum 
claims where Muslim women have been persecuted because their understanding of 
Islam differs from that of the state. She notes that in these circumstances the women’s 
claims have been presented as gender persecution when in fact they are based on 
political opinion (feminist or otherwise) or religion. She explains that, because of 
stereotypical views held by adjudicators on the capacity of Islamic women to act 
politically and a conception that Islam is monolithic, often, the true situation is not 
presented:  
                                                 
36
  Kapur, above n 10,19.   
37
  An example is provided by the intervention in the case of Amina Lawal in Nigeria against the 
express wishes of local activists:  See Ali Mari Tripp, ‘Challenges in Transnational Mobilisation’ in Ali 
Mari Tripp and Myra  Marx Ferree (eds.) Globalism, Feminism: Transnational Women’s Activism, 
Organizing and Human Rights (2006) NYU Press, New York, 299. 
38
 Kapur, above n 10.   
39
  Razack, above n 33, 15. 
40
  Ibid. 
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[F]irst, because the applicant is given a choice of either denouncing ‘Islam’ altogether 
or foregoing her claim, her ability to express a different set of religious beliefs other 
than is practised by the government she flees is silenced; second, because, the 
government’s actions are portrayed as being legitimately required by the religion 
itself, the applicant’s opposition to such actions can never be seen as political and the 
political nature of her opposition is stultified.41 
 
 
Focussing only on the gender of the applicants and ignoring other aspects of a 
woman’s identity or positionality42 creates this incomplete picture. In contrast, I adopt 
a ‘difference’ approach which analyses discrimination not by attributing essential 
characteristics to women but instead by recognising how their positioning 
(unfavourably) compares with dominant norms of personhood. This approach must 
take into account characteristics other than sex where they also present a difference to 
the dominant norm. It therefore allows for differences among women and differences 
among Islamic women. In Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist 
Thought,43 Elisabeth Spelman asks whether it is ‘… possible for us to think of a 
woman’s ‘womaness’ in abstraction from the fact that she is a particular woman, 
whether she is a middle-class Black woman living in North America in the twentieth 
century or a poor white woman living in France in the seventeenth century…’44 We 
might add, in the context of the case study below, the example of an Islamic student 
manifesting her religion by wearing a headscarf to university.   
 
III - The Council Of Europe  
And Women’s Freedom To Manifest Religion 
                                                 
41
  Akram, above n 34,26,27. 
42
  The term positionality, which is sometimes also referred to as ‘ascriptive social perspective’ or 
‘social group differentiation’ is used by Iris Marion Young  (see Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and 
Democracy,(2000) Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Melissa Williams (see Melissa Williams, 
Voice, Trust and Memory : Marginalized Groups and the Failure of Liberal Representation (2001) 
Princeton University Press, Princeton) to denote the external characteristics attributed to the concept of 
woman, race , class, religious group etc or any combination e.g. Islamic woman. This is quite separate 
from any characteristics that the group in question might use to define itself. Thus ‘social positioning 
‘may be a facet or aspect of identity it can also be distinguished from identity.     
43
 Elizabeth Spelman , Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, (1988)  
Beacon Press, Boston.  
44
  Ibid 13. 
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The Council of Europe has delivered very positive leadership in setting rights 
standards and adjudicating rights claims in Europe in many respects. Yet within the 
Council of Europe’s discussions on the rights of Islamic women orientalism is 
manifest. This is particularly clear in the cases around women’s right to manifest 
religion, where the process of rights adjudication has been used as a tool of 
assimilation, rather than protection from discrimination based on difference.  
 
Though it is a regional system, the Council of Europe is not just confined to 
influencing rights systems within Europe. It has a wide-ranging membership 
consisting of 47 countries. In addition observers from Israel, Canada, the United 
States, Japan, Mexico and the Holy See attend the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assemblies. As the first international court to allow individual petitions, the long 
ECtHR jurisprudence exercises considerable influence around the world.45 
Pronouncements from this human rights institution are important not only because 
they influence the domestic laws and shape the cultural norms of the member states 
but because they are also open to assimilation, supplementation and adaptive 
interpretation by other domestic and international courts and governments.46  
  
Problems with the approach of the Council of Europe can be seen both in the case law 
(and in the lack of it) and in resolutions from the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly – the Committee on Equality between Men and Women.  There is criticism 
of this approach from within: individual authors like Renata Uitz47 whose views are 
publicised through the Council of Europe and the resolutions and reports from the 
European Commission on Racism and Intolerance48 provide an alternative perspective 
and make a welcome contribution to debate in this area.  
                                                 
45
  Note, for example, New Zealand's reluctance to dispose of the Privy Council as a final court because 
the Privy Council was considered o provide a link to the adjudication on the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.   
46
   Ruth Rubio-Marin and Martha I Morgan, in ‘Constitutional Domestication of International Gender 
Norms: Categorisations, Illustrations and Reflections from the Nearside of the Bridge,’ Karen Knopp 
(ed.) Gender and Human Rights (2004) Oxford University Press, Oxford,.113 suggest that the principal 
way that these three forms transmit international law is through transjudicialism.  
47
  Renata Uitz, Freedom of Religion in European Constitutional and International Law (2007) Council 
of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.  
48
  European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), ECRI General Policy 
Recommendation No 5, On Combating Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims, Adopted 16th 
March 2000, Strasbourg 2000. 
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Under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
right to ‘freedom of religion’ and to ‘manifest religion’ appears as Article 9 (1) and 
(2) and corresponds closely to the wording of Article 18 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ‘right to religion’ in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) Article 19. The Article asserts an absolute 
right to ‘freedom of religion’ under Article 9(1) and distinguishes a limited right to 
‘manifest religion’ under Article 9 (2) which provides that it can be curtailed by:  
 
“Such limitations as prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”49 
 
Where a claim is brought in relation to rights that are ‘limited’ in this way, the ECtHR 
must first evaluate if there has been some interference with the right. It must then 
consider whether the interference was carried out in accordance with ‘law’ and 
whether it was in pursuance of a ‘legitimate aim’, and, finally, the Court must ask 
whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society,’ taking into account 
whether the level of interference was proportionate in relation to the aim pursued. In 
relation to the latter, there is a ‘margin of appreciation’ allowed to each state within 
which the courts can consider the specific conditions pertaining to the state in 
question. This means making allowances for local conditions between states in the 
way that rights are implemented. When applying the ‘margin of appreciation’, the 
Court evaluates how other member states have dealt with the same rights within their 
domestic jurisdictions. In addition, there is often an attempt within Court decisions to 
locate the European position within wider rights jurisprudence.  
 
The history of adjudication on Article 9 under the ECHR supports Paul Marshall’s 
findings on the global neglect of the rights to religion.50  Though the Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms came into being in 1953,51 the first Article 
                                                 
49
  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 9, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG 
50
  See Marshall, above n 5... 
51
  It was opened for signature in 1950. 
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9 claim under individual petition52 was not considered in the ECtHR until 1993.53  
Claims were made before this, but relying on the distinction between the right to 
‘freedom of religion’ and the right to ‘manifest religion’ the European Commission on 
Human Rights deemed these inadmissible. Of those Article 9 cases found to be 
admissible, the Court has been heavily criticised 54 for its differential handling of 
rights to religion and in particular for its construction of some religions as ‘other’ in 
the context of European experience.55 Even so, there appears to be especially poor 
treatment of claims to be free to manifest religion made by women.56 This can be 
located within a wider trend within ECHR jurisprudence to fail to develop equality 
jurisprudence under Article 1457 and to engage fully with women’s rights.58   
 
In the years before  Sahin v Turkey,59 the seminal case in this area which I discuss 
below, a number of similar claims had been deemed inadmissible by the Commission. 
For instance the Commission had previously dismissed ‘as manifestly unfounded’ 
claims by a teacher who was prevented from wearing a headscarf in her employment 
(Dahlab v Switzerland) and a student who was unable to graduate unless she removed 
her headscarf for a photo (Karaduman v Turkey).60 Therefore, despite the poor history 
of adjudication on Article 9 claims there was great hope when Sahin61 was held to be 
admissible. In Turkey, there was a belief that this claim would be considered in the 
light of other Turkish rights breaches and hope that this jurisprudence would 
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contribute to the development of a culture of respect for rights by the Turkish 
government.62  
 
The case of Leyla Sahin concerned a student who was excluded from her university 
for wearing a headscarf. Leyla Sahin, a practising Muslim, studied medicine in 
Turkey from 1993 until her expulsion from the University of Istanbul in 1998.  She 
chose to manifest her religion by wearing a headscarf and had worn a headscarf to the 
University of Bursa for the four years she studied there. She was also initially allowed 
to wear it to the University of Istanbul when she transferred her studies there in 1997. 
In February 1998, the university issued a circular notifying that there would be a 
clamp down on prohibited forms of dress, which included the wearing of ‘Islamic 
headscarfs’. In March 1998, Sahin was first refused access to her year five exams 
because she was wearing a headscarf. Subsequently she was refused access to other 
classes and exams. Although her actions remained peaceable and her protests 
consisted of appealling to the authorities, she refused to remove her headscarf and was 
expelled.  After exhausting her claims in the domestic courts, she applied to the 
European Court of Human Rights.63 She argued that the ban and the expulsion had 
breached her Article 9 ‘right of freedom to manifest religion’ and her Protocol 1 (2) 
right to ‘freedom to education’ she also claimed a breach of Article 8 right to private 
and family life, Article 10, right to freedom of expression and Article 14 the right to 
be free from discrimination, in relation to enjoyment of the Convention rights.  
 
The case was first heard by a Chamber of 9 judges and then, on appeal by Sahin, to a 
Grand Chamber composed of 17 judges. The Grand Chamber affirmed the decision 
and reasoning of the Chamber in finding that there was interference with Article 9(2) 
but there was no breach of Article 9 and that Articles 8, Article 10, and Article 14 
which were considered to have added nothing to the claim.  
 
Unlike the Chamber, the Grand Chamber found it was appropriate to consider the 
Protocol 1 Art. 2 right to education separately. In relation to this they also found 
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interference with the right, which had been restricted by the prohibition in the 
circular.64 In keeping with the finding on Article 9, they likewise considered that the 
aim of keeping educational institutions secular was a legitimate aim because it related 
to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others65 and that it had been imposed 
proportionally.66  
 
The approach taken by both chambers was surprising. As noted by Judge Tulkens in 
her dissenting opinion, it seemed that the Court had abandoned its role of review 
altogether.67 Certainly the logic used to support Turkey’s position was flawed and 
clearly based on a number of presumptions rather than any evidence presented by the 
state. Arguably, it seems that neo-orientalist perspectives blinded both Chambers from 
requiring the state to prove the case for interference. The Grand Chamber accepted 
without demur the assertion by Turkey that the interference was ‘reasonably necessary 
in a democratic society’ in order to pursue the legitimate aims of maintaining 
secularism and promoting women’s equality.68 The problem, as pointed out by Judge 
Tulkens in her dissenting judgement, is that the claims of the state are not submitted 
to any rigorous human rights analysis.69  While Turkey raised women’s equality as a 
‘legitimate aim’, Turkey neither had to justify headscarf bans as necessary to achieve 
this aim nor argue that they were a proportionate way of achieving it. Moreover, the 
Grand Chamber accepted that equality for women could only be achieved within the 
particular brand of secularism espoused by Turkey without stating why it considered 
this to be so. The claims were seen as self-evident.  
 
The key to this thinking lies perhaps in the unequivocal position that the Grand 
Chamber adopted in relation to the ‘headscarf. ’ In a statement, cited with approval by 
both Chambers, from the earlier report on Dahlab v Switzerland70, the Commission 
referred to the headscarf as a ‘powerful external symbol’ capable of having a 
‘proselytising effect, seeing that it appeared to be imposed on women by a religious 
                                                 
64
  Sahin v Turkey above n 6 at paragraph 157. 
65
  Ibid at 158. 
66
  Ibid at 159 -162. 
67
  Ibid, dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, para 3.  
68
  Dahlab v Switzerland 42393/98 15 January 2001 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/Dahlab_v_Switzerland.pdf 
69
  Sahin v Turkey above n 6 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, para 3. 
70
  Dahlab v Switzerland 42393/98 15 January 2001  
 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice (2009) Vol 4, pp 34-73 
precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality.’71 This, it was 
said by the Commission in Dahlab, ‘could not easily be reconciled with the message 
of tolerance, respect for others and, above all equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers in a democratic society should convey to their pupils.’72 By supporting this 
view of the headscarf the Grand Chamber assigns the applicant to a dual role as a 
‘victim’ who is forced to wear the headscarf by religious precept, and also as a 
member of an aggressor religion posing a threat to tolerance, democracy and to other 
women.73 Debate on the meaning of the headscarf is absent and the Grand Chamber 
seems to believe that it needs no more evidence of a threat to democracy or of the 
impact on women’s equality. In this way, the Grand Chamber confuses two issues: 
Sahin’s individual right to manifest personal religious beliefs by wearing a headscarf 
and the corporate right of a monolithic ‘Islam’ to impose the headscarf on women.   
 
It is problematic that the Grand Chamber addresses this case as if it is about a ban on 
religious symbols in general74 when it is only limited to Islamic religious symbols.75 It 
is also problematic that there is no discussion of the nature of secularism and its 
relation to democracy. The assumption that the wearing of religious symbols in public 
institutions per se is both incompatible with secularism and a threat to secularism is 
not based on any evidence.76  
 
Judge Tulkens makes the point very clearly that the judgment elides fundamentalism 
with headscarf wearing and shows why the Grand Chamber is not entitled to do this:   
 
“While everyone agrees on the need to prevent radical Islamism, … [m]erely wearing 
the headscarf cannot be associated with fundamentalism and it is vital to distinguish 
between those who wear the headscarf and ‘extremists’ who seek to impose the 
headscarf as they do other religious symbols. Not all women who wear the headscarf 
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are fundamentalists and there is nothing to suggest that the applicant held 
fundamentalist views...  The applicant’s personal interest in exercising the right of 
freedom of religion and to manifest her religion by an external symbol cannot be 
wholly absorbed by the public interest in fighting extremism.77  
 
Equality and non-discrimination are subjective rights which must remain under the 
control of those who are entitled to benefit from them. ‘Paternalism’ of this sort runs 
counter to the case-law of the Court, which has developed a real right to personal 
autonomy on the basis of Article 8…”78 
 
Tulkens contrasts the position of Leyla Sahin with the male applicant in Gundez v 
Turkey. In Gundez once again the ECtHR expressed neo-orientalist views, presenting 
Islam as a monolithic and anti-democratic entity. Despite this, they were still 
concerned to recognise the balance between fighting extremism and individual 
freedom:  
 
“It [is] difficult to declare ones support for democracy and human rights while at the 
same time supporting a regime based on Sharia… Sharia which faithfully reflected 
the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, was stable and invariable and 
clearly diverged from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law 
and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it 
intervened in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts. … However the Court considers that the mere fact of defending Sharia 
without calling for violence to establish it cannot be regarded as ‘hate speech’”.79 
 
One difference in this case is that the Chamber considered it was dealing with 
‘speech’ which they regarded as political expression. In Sahin the Grand Chamber 
accepted the government’s view of the headscarf as a political symbol but they would 
not recognise Sahin’s claim to freedom of expression. This position is contradictory: 
though Sahin was not wearing the headscarf as a political statement Turkey had 
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politicised headscarf-wearing, so her opposition to the ban is clearly political 
expression. In this sense, the positions adopted by the ECtHR  in Sahin and Gundez 
seem irreconcilable and reveal a clearly gendered difference in approach to the two 
cases. ‘Thus, manifesting one’s religion by peacefully wearing a headscarf may be 
prohibited whereas, in the same context, remarks which could be construed as 
incitement to religious hatred are covered by freedom of expression.’80  
 
The language and logic behind the Grand Chamber’s neo-orientalist approach 
suggests the continuation of a tradition of older discourses. In particular, writers 
discussing orientalism note the ‘enduring fascination with the harem and the veil.’81 
Current discourses around the headscarf are still heavily influenced by 19th Century 
interpretations which viewed ‘veiling’ as the visible signifier of the oppression of 
Muslim women.82 Joan Scott Wallach suggests that it is significant that the term ‘veil’ 
is still widely used to refer to all forms of ‘hijab’ - including headscarves - which do 
not cover the face, and argues that this indicates deep anxieties about the 
identification of Islam and women.83 
 
This neo-orientalist position taken by the Commission and the ECtHR on headscarves 
is echoed by other Council of Europe institutions. Shortly before the decision from the 
Grand Chamber, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly debated a report, 
produced by the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, on Women 
and Religion in Europe84 and subsequently passed a resolution of the same name.85 
The report was striking in that it presented a partial look at the problems associated 
with women and religion in Europe. It focussed only on the problems posed to women 
from within their religious communities rather than also looking at the discrimination 
experienced by women on the basis of their religion. In the report, the Special 
                                                 
80
  Sahin, above n 6 Tulkens, para. 9. 
81
  Weber, above n 28, 125.  
82
  Ibid.   
83
  Joan Scott Wallach , The Politics of the Veil ( 2007)  Princeton University Press, Princeton.16, and 
see Chapter 5. In response to this focus and fixation with the ‘veil’ some young women have adopted 
the headscarf as a political statement against the oppression of their communities. See Joseph Carens,  
Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Even-handedness (2000) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 160-161. 
84
  Rosemarie Zapfl-Helbling Women and Religion in Europe Doc. 10670 16th September 2005. 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc05/EDOC10670.htm 
85
  Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1464, Women and Religion In Europe, (2005) 4th October 2005. 
 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice (2009) Vol 4, pp 34-73 
Rapporteur86 acknowledges that there are criticisms of the way that all religions treat 
women but, despite this, her focus is clearly on the threats that she perceives as 
coming from outside Europe. For instance, she cites ‘female genital mutilation, crimes 
of honour, certain practices linked to marriage and its dissolution, lack of access to 
education or certain professions, and the preference for boys’ as obvious examples of  
‘…ostensibly religious practices violating women’s rights’87 and  she notes that these 
are associated with ‘certain minority religions or immigrant communities.’88 This is 
despite the fact that these ‘ostensibly religious practices’ have no ostensible links with 
religion.  
 
The report also asserted that the ‘most widespread and visible problem in Europe 
concerns the Islamic dress code for women, i.e. the headscarf.’89 While the 
Rapporteur recognises that there is some debate on symbolic significance, she 
believes that ‘…it is often impossible to determine whether the wearing of a headscarf 
(or more covering garments) is imposed, self imposed or a matter of free choice…’90 
However, any nuance in the debate on meaning disappears with the Rapporteur’s 
statement that:  
 
‘[T]he reason why I find it so difficult to respect the headscarf as a religious symbol 
like any other is that there is so much baggage that comes with it, a sense of 
submission to the control by men of a girl or woman’s destiny and the way she leads 
her life. Allowing young girls to wear headscarves in school can quickly lead to other 
demands by certain Muslim communities, such as separate swimming or sports 
lessons for girls in schools, or even the banning of co-education altogether. Where do 
we draw the line?”91  
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In the final Resolution passed by the Parliamentary Assembly, religious dress codes 
are censured92 and this provides a tacit approval of the decision in Sahin.     
 
 
IV - The Human Rights Context  
And Consequences Of This Approach  
 
In coming to their decision in the Sahin case, the Grand Chamber looked at the 
situation in other countries within the Council of Europe and also referred to Council 
of Europe materials on higher education.93 The Judges noted that some other countries 
had headscarf bans within schools and public institutions but there seemed to be no 
consensus among member states on whether this was appropriate. This lack of 
consensus was used to justify the wide margin of appreciation allowed to Turkey by 
the Grand Chamber. However, as Judge Tulkens points out, at this time no other state 
in the Council of Europe had a ban on the headscarf for adult students.94 Furthermore, 
in Sahin, Council of Europe recommendations on the role of higher education in 
promoting human rights and tolerance95 were in effect used contrary to their 
intention96 as justification for excluding religious attire.97 
 
It is notable that in Sahin, the Grand Chamber did not refer to the European 
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Policy Recommendation 5 
issued in 2000. This recommendation was entitled Combating Intolerance and 
Discrimination against Muslims. It recognised the prevalence of orientalist discourse 
and ‘strongly regretted that Islam is sometimes portrayed inaccurately on the basis of 
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hostile stereotyping…’.98 The committee said it was ‘rejecting all deterministic views 
of Islam and recognising the great diversity intrinsic in the practice of this religion.’ 
Amongst other matters, the recommendation urged member states to ‘take the 
necessary measures to eliminate any manifestation of discrimination on grounds of 
religious belief in access to education’99 and advised member states to ‘pay particular 
attention to the situation of Muslim women, who may suffer both from discrimination 
against women in general and from discrimination against Muslims…’. 100 However, 
even if the Grand Chamber in Sahin had examined this recommendation, the specific 
points in it were aimed at ‘governments of member states, where Muslim 
communities are settled and live in minority situation in their countries,’101 so, by 
default, the ECRI excluded Turkey where Muslims are a majority.   
 
In Sahin, no other international rights instruments or recommendations from regional 
or international Committees were examined, though at the relevant time, similar 
issues were being addressed by other international committees and non-governmental 
organisations. It is suggested that if the Grand Chamber had examined the issue 
within a wider frame, it may have had cause to re-think the simplicity of its 
conclusion about an automatic connection between the promotion of equality and 
human rights and the headscarf ban.  
 
Given the emphasis placed on imposing the ban as part of a strategy to achieve 
women’s equality, the Court should have gone on to consider whether this ban had 
any other consequences for women as well as how it fitted in with Turkey’s wider 
equality strategy. The United Nations expert committee on women’s rights, the 
Committee for the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), considered Turkey’s combined fourth and fifth reports in 
February 2005. This consideration took place after the Chamber decision but before 
consideration by the Grand Chamber. The CEDAW committee questioned state-
sanctioned activities which directly discriminated against and degraded women, 
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including so-called virginity checks on women.102 In the context of Turkey’s failure to 
address its own obviously discriminatory policies and practices, its claims that the 
headscarf ban was motivated by equality concerns are dubious. 
   
While the CEDAW committee did not specifically denounce the headscarf ban as 
contrary to women’s rights, they raised concerns about its impact. The Committee 
was particularly concerned that, in Turkey, ‘girls and women lag behind men and 
boys’ in education and that female students tend to be ‘directed into single sex 
vocational and technical high schools.’103 In question and answer sessions, the 
Committee asked Turkey what measures it had taken to ensure that the headscarf ban 
did not affect the rights of women and girls to educational opportunities.104 No 
satisfactory answer was forthcoming and, in their concluding comments on the 
reports, they noted their concern in relation to the ‘…impact on girls and women of 
the ban on wearing headscarves in schools and Universities.’ They asked specifically 
that Turkey ‘… monitor and assess the impact of the ban on wearing headscarves and 
[to] compile information on the number of women who have been excluded from 
schools and universities because of the ban.’105  
 
Also at this time, Human Rights Watch (HRW), a major international non-
governmental organisation, prepared a full briefing paper on the issue of the Turkish 
headscarf ban and its impact on academic freedom and women’s access to higher 
education in Turkey.106 HRW not only considered the ban contrary to the right to 
manifest religion and contrary to equality principles, but also found serious harm to 
the education of girls and women as a consequence.  
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Prior to the Grand Chamber hearing, a case similar to Sahin was heard by the Human 
Rights Committee under the optional protocol to the ICCPR. In Raihon 
Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan,107 a student claimed that an Uzbeki law prohibiting 
religious dress in public places had excluded her from a state university. She had been 
wearing ‘hijab’.108 Her claim was brought under Freedom to Manifest Religion, 
Article 18 of the Covenant. The Committee was clear that the ban constituted 
interference with her right, and that the burden of proof lay with the State to justify 
this interference under the limitations allowed by Article 18. In stark contrast to Sahin 
v Turkey, the Committee upheld Hudoyberganova’s complaint on the basis that it was 
not presented with evidence justifying the interference.  
 
The worrying consequences of the Council of Europe’s approach are three-fold. 
Firstly, it called the Council of Europe rights system into question. Secondly, it has 
been influential in changing the law of member states. Thirdly, and finally, this 
approach has supported damaging discourses around Islamic rights and particularly in 
relation to the rights of visibly Muslim women.  
 
Following the decision by the Grand Chamber in Sahin, the Turkish ‘Virtue Party’ 
which had been dissolved by Turkey in 2001, withdrew its appeal to the ECtHR.109  
The case had been pending since 2001. Nicholas Gibson notes that the reason given 
for the withdrawal was that the Party did not think it would get a fair hearing since the 
ECtHR had adopted a double standard when dealing with ‘European Muslims [who 
are] confronted by injustice because of their beliefs.’110 As Gibson suggests, whether 
or not you believe it to be true, this ‘perception’ is problematic in ensuring respect for 
the rule of law.111  
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The approach of the ECtHR appears to be at variance to those of other international 
rights bodies and there are concerns about its approach within the Council of Europe. 
In a number of reports submitted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion and Belief in 2005 and 2006, concerns were raised about the ban on religious 
symbols, including headscarves.112 Judge Tulkens’ dissent in the Sahin case was 
highlighted approvingly.113 A number of human rights non-governmental 
organisations - Amnesty International (AI),114 Human Rights Watch (HRW),115  
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF),116 and Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)117among them  - have expressed 
the opinion that such bans are contrary to the human rights of women. ECtHR 
jurisprudence in relation to Islam and freedom of religion has been found to be 
problematic in a major report in the Council of Europe series, Europeans and Their 
Rights.118 If another case arises in the ECtHR it is to be hoped that the non-
governmental organisation, Interights, will intervene to ensure fair debate and 
adjudication.119 In the light of these concerns about the compatibility of bans on 
religious symbols with human rights norms, it is worrying that even if the case law 
from the ECtHR and the former Commission has not directly encouraged further bans 
on religious symbols, it has not checked it in any way. The link between earlier 
Commission and ECtHR cases and Turkey’s move to renew the prohibition on 
headscarves is clear. The Circular which renewed the prohibition and led to Sahin’s 
                                                 
112
  Asma  Jahangir, (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief) Civil and Political Rights, 
Including the Question of Religious Intolerance, Economic and Social Council E/CN.4/2005/61 20 
December 2004; Jahangir, Asma, (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief)  Civil and 
Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance: E/CN.4/2006/5 9 January 2006; 
Jahangir, Asma, (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief)  Implementation of General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15th March 2006 Entitled ‘Human Rights Council’ A/HRC/4/21 26 
December 2006.  
113
  Jahangir, Asma, (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief) Civil and Political Rights, 
Including the Question of Religious Intolerance: E/CN.4/2006/5 9 January 2006, paras. 47 and 60.  
114
  Amnesty International Report, The State Of the Worlds Human Rights (2007) 
http://archive.amnesty.org/report2007/document/231/default.htm at November 2008 
115
  Human Rights Watch, above n 103. 
116
   International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in the OSCE Region: The Balkans, the Caucasus, 
Europe, Central Asia and North American Report 2001 (Events 2000) http://www.ihf-
hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=1783  at November 2008 
117
   Hate Crimes In the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses Annual Report for 2007 , Warsaw, 
October 2008  http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2008/10/33850_1196_en.pdf 
118
  Uitz, above n 50. 
119
  Note than in the recent case of Opuz v Turkey App 33401/02 9th June 2009 Interights intervened and 
the result was a landmark ruling on the s duty of the state to protect women’s rights in the context of 
domestic violence. The state was found to be at fault and the Court did not, as in Sahin, cite the Turkish 
constitution’s respect for equality as a way of defeating the claim against the state.  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/violence/Opuz v  Turkey.pdf  at June 2009. 
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expulsion explicitly stated that it was regulating students’ clothing ‘by virtue of the 
Constitution, the law and regulations, and in accordance with the case-law of the 
Supreme Administrative Court and the European Commission of Human Rights...’120   
 
Other Council of Europe members have also sought bans on religious dress in the 
context of state employment and educational institutions though no other country as 
yet has tried to limit the dress of university students. The ban on religious symbols in 
schools in France was introduced in 2004.121 Announced in early 2004, it came into 
force after the first Sahin decision. France has since gone further and refused a woman 
citizenship because she wore a niqab.122 Faiza Silmi, whose husband was already a 
citizen, had her application turned down on the basis of ‘insufficient assimilation into 
France’.123 On appeal, the French Council of State said that she had ‘adopted a radical 
practice of her religion, incompatible with essential values of the French community, 
particularly the principle of equality of the sexes…’.124 In Germany, over half of the 
sixteen Land (federal states) have enacted legislation to prohibit the wearing of 
headscarves by teachers and, in some cases, civil servants and law enforcement 
officers.125 The federal Constitutional Court in Germany overturned a prohibition 
imposed on a teacher by Baden-Württemberg in 2003 because there was no relevant 
legislation in place, but the decision left the way open for individual states to pass 
specific legislation. In some Land, the bans operate like the French ban against all 
conspicuous symbols; however, in five Land, the relevant legislation contains 
exemptions for Christian symbols such as nun’s habits.126 These exemptions for 
Christian symbols have been justified on the basis that ‘such clothing and symbols are 
                                                 
120
  Sahin (2004), above n 62 at para. 12. 
121
  The French ban differs from the Turkish in that it does not directly discriminate against Muslims 
because it covers all obvious religious symbols, not just Islamic symbols. The ban does not extend to 
Universities.  However this is still of concern to the IHF and HRW who believe it contravenes human 
rights norms by indirectly discriminating against Muslims and by infringing the religious freedom and 
freedom of expression of other groups.  IHF Press Release, 17 December 2004 ‘A French Ban on 
Religious Symbols Would Violate International Protection of Freedom of Religion.’ Http//www.ihf-
hr.org. ; HRW  France: Headscarf Ban Violates Religious Freedom 26 February 2004 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/02/26/france-headscarf-ban-violates-religious-freedom 
122
  This is a something which is worn to cover the nose and mouth but leaves the eyes visible.  
123
  Katrin Bennhold, ‘A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship.’ The New York Times, 19 July 2008, 
1. 
124
  Ibid  2. 
125
  Human Rights Watch, Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality: Headscarf Bans for Teachers and 
Civil Servants in Germany, 1—56432-441- 9 February 2009 http://www.hrw.org/Discrimination in the 
Name of Neutrality | Human Rights Watchen/node/80829/section/4  at March 2009. 
126
  Ibid 26. 
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in line with and preserve the values in their state constitutions (themselves influenced 
by Christianity) ... government entities have claimed that Christian clothing and 
symbols do not therefore risk compromising the neutrality or peace of the school.’127 
The headscarf, they say, is a ‘political symbol of Islamic fundamentalism, which 
expresses the dissociation from values of the Western society like individual self-
determinism and emancipation of women.’128  
 
These examples from France and Germany are not isolated, several other countries in 
the Council of Europe have also instated headscarf bans and, in January of 2008, there 
was an attempt to get the EU to commit to a legislative ban across all member states 
in relation to ‘headscarves and hijab at least at primary school…’129 This was defeated 
by 367 to 200 votes (134 abstentions).130Although the UK does not have any 
legislative prohibitions in place, the influence of ECtHR jurisprudence became 
evident in a recent case concerning a Muslim girl, Ms Begum, who took her school to 
court because it would not let her wear the jilbab, a long, long sleeved coat.131 The 
Court of Appeal found that the school had not adopted the right tests and, in 
particular, had not considered whether there was sufficient justification for preventing 
Ms. Begum’s choice of clothes. For this reason, they found in Begum’s favour, 
although they also noted that their holding did not preclude a correctly-reached 
decision to prohibit this clothing. In contrast, the House of Lords was unanimous in 
finding in the school’s favour although different approaches were adopted by the Law 
Lords in coming to this conclusion. Two of the members, Lady Brenda Hale and Lord 
Nicholls, were concerned that the school be found to justify their decision, and held, 
                                                 
127
  Ibid 27. 
128
  Ibid 29. citing the debate in North Rhine-Westphalia Parliament (emphasis added).  
129
  European Parliament, Report: Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. (Draftswoman Marie Panaytopolos-Cassiodorus, Committee 
on Women’s rights and Gender Equality. A6-0520/2007, RR\39081EN.doc PE390.381v03-00 
20.12.2007. Para 127.   
130
  This particular proposal was defeated on 16 January 2008. 
http://www.euronews.net/2008/01/16/meps-reject-muslim-headscarf-ban-in-primary-schools/.  Figures 
for the vote are taken from Scottish MEP Alyn Smith’s website. 
http://www.alynsmith.eu/news/128/64/SNP-MEP-And-MSP-Team-Hail-Rejection-Of-Call-For-EU-
Headscarf-Ban.html.   For the debate see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2009-
0012&format=XML&language=EN   at May 2009 
131
  R (on the application of Begum ( by her litigation next friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School (Appellants) [2006] UKHL 15 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060322/begum.pdf  at November 2008 
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on all the evidence, that they had done so.132 Lady Hale discussed Judge Tulkens 
dissent in Sahin with approval and distanced her opinion from the majority decision in 
Sahin, noting that, in this case, there was ‘the evidence …., which Judge Tulkens 
found lacking in the Sahin case…’133 The other three Lords made reference to Sahin 
and on the basis of their understanding of the discussion of a right to education, held 
that it was not necessary for the school to show any justification for their actions. 
Begum, they argued, had not had her right interfered with because she could leave 
that particular school and go to school elsewhere.134  
 
At present, the Council of Europe seems to be at variance with other rights agencies, 
yet Sahin holds some authority, even outside the jurisdiction of the Council of 
Europe. For instance, in the Human Rights Committee ICCPR case of Raihon 
Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan,135 Ruth Wedgwood, a member of the US Secretary of 
State Advisory Committee on International Law, the US National Security Group and 
US expert at the UN Human Rights Committee, cited Sahin v Turkey with approval in 
her individual (dissenting) opinion in the case.136  It is also unclear exactly how the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) regards 
this issue. Rahime Kayan v Turkey, a claim brought by a Turkish teacher who was 
sacked for wearing a headscarf, was dismissed because the Committee considered that 
the applicant had failed to exhaust her domestic remedies.137  Though the Committee 
continues to raise concerns around state bans on religious clothing in its reports, it has 
yet to refute arguments that the bans are legitimately driven by concern for 
equality.138   
                                                 
132
  Ibid at 41. 
133
  Ibid at 98. 
134
  For the UK, this marks a retrograde step in the understanding of discrimination, as compared to the 
approach in Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (UK House of Lords), a case heard under the Race 
Relations Act in the early 1980’s. 
135
  Communication No. 931/2000 UN Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2004). 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/931-2000.html  at March 2009. 
136
   This dissent appears in the report of the case above but has  disappeared from others.   
137
  Rahime Kayhan v Turkey Communication No-8/2005 CEDAW/c/34/D/8/2005. 
138
  See for instance The 2008 Annual Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women 40th and 41st session , UN, New York 2008, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/458/40/PDF/N0845840.pdf?OpenElement at March 
2009, paras. 324 and 325 - comments on French submission. In contrast see shadow reports to the 
Committee – which believe the bans to be a clear breach of CEDAW. For instance the Dutch Equal 
Treatment Committee Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 2009 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/CGB_Netherlands_cedaw45.pdf  at March 
2009. 
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In addition to its influence on rights discourse and adjudication, the message 
conveyed by the determinations of the former Commission and the ECtHR has wider 
consequences. The support for state headscarf bans also has dire consequences for the 
everyday lived experience of Muslim women and particularly ‘visible’ Muslim 
women in Europe. Until recently, very few countries recorded incidents of hate crime 
against Muslims,139 although the ECRI recommended that all countries do this.140  
Where reporting is taking place, the European Union Monitoring Centre notes 
increases in discrimination and abuse against Muslims and they estimate that the 
problem is far greater than conveyed by existing statistics.141 Women wearing 
headscarves are visible representatives of an Islamic religion and culture which has 
become stigmatised as ‘other’ in Europe. After the London bombings of 2005, the 
Chair of the Council of Mosques in the UK noted the increasing number of verbal and 
physical attacks on Muslim women wearing the headscarf and advised women to 
protect themselves by abandoning the headscarf if they felt threatened.142 Attacks on 
women wearing the headscarf are Europe-wide. The European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) report from 2006 noted increasing numbers of attacks 
across Europe on women wearing headscarves.143 The ODIHR report on Hate Crimes 
in the OSCE Region similarly noted that women wearing the headscarf were being 
targeted.144 The reports also note that attackers often remove or try to rip off the 
headscarves.  
 
                                                 
139
  Though the discrimination has been evident.  
140
  European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), ECRI General Policy 
Recommendation No 5, On Combating Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims, Adopted 16th 
March 2000. Strasbourg 2000. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/gpr/en/recommendation_n5/Rec5 en21.pdf  at 
March 2009. 
141
  See for instance the report from the European Union Monitoring Centre ‘ Racism and Islamaphobia 
in the Member States of the EU’ December 2006 http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/racism/report-
racism-0807-en-pdf  at 1 December 2007. 
142
  Reported on BBC News Tuesday 4th of August 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4742869.stm. at 
November 2008. 
143
  European Union Monitoring Centre ‘Racism and Islamaphobia in the Member States of the EU’ 
December 2006 http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/racism/report-racism-0807-en-pdf  at  December 
2007. 
144
  OSCE Office For Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – 
Incidents and Responses,  Annual Report for 2007, Warsaw October 2008 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_33850.html  at November 2008. 
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These statistics might be interpreted to suggest that the headscarf acts merely as an 
identifier of a stigmatised community, but a number of authors/activist groups posit a 
stronger connection between the nature of the debate around the headscarf and attacks 
on Muslims, particularly Muslim women. The International Helsinki Federation 
suggested that ‘laws targeting’ the ‘Islamic headscarf’ serve ‘to mistakenly stigmatise 
all Muslim women wearing the headscarf as religious fundamentalists.’145 The 
ODIHR notes that when bans are proposed on headscarves the discourse focuses on 
the headscarf as both a symbol of oppression and as symbolic of ‘a lack of willingness 
to integrate into host societies.’146 It argues that attacks on women wearing 
headscarves must be viewed within the context of this public discourse. So, while I do 
not suggest that debate itself focuses attention on the headscarf as a locus for hatred 
against Islamic communities, I believe that the reductive nature of these debates leads 
to the headscarf as a source of stigmatism. 
 
The problem of feminist engagement with this area becomes apparent when attacks on 
Muslim women by either the state or dominant majority groups are ignored by 
feminist analysis. When some feminist groups praise the outcome of Sahin and 
themselves view women wearing the headscarf either as ‘victims’ or as traitors to a 
feminist cause,147 it seems that a concern for women’s rights has been abandoned in 




This article examined the interrelationship between feminism and ‘orientalism’ in 
relation to approaches taken by the Council of Europe in relation to women’s right to 
religion. The European Court of Human Rights and the Commission before it and the 
Committee on Equality fail to see Muslim women as full rights-holders in relation to 
the right to religion because they hold a vision of an ‘equal woman’ as a woman who 
                                                 
145
  Speaking of France in 2005 ‘A French Ban on Religious Symbols Would Violate International 
Protection of Freedom of Religion.’ Http//www.ihf-hr.org. at 1 December 2007. 
146
  OSCE, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region, above n 144 at 90 footnote 445. 
147
  See Women Living Under Muslim Laws’ interview of 'Four Francophone Feminists on the 
‘headscarf ban’’ http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[157]=x-157-44910  at May 
2009. 
 See also the response from some English ‘feminists’ to Manal Omar’s article ‘I Felt More Welcome in 
the Bible belt’ Guardian Friday April 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2007/apr/20/fashion.religion  at November 2008. 
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is free from religious identity.  This position is supported by essentialist feminist 
perspectives which fail to recognise both the intersectional nature of identity and 
understand the way in which this mediates discrimination against women. The 
persistence of this ‘orientalist’ perspective from the European Convention treaty 
bodies simultaneously causes and obscures the very serious discrimination facing 
women from minority groups in Europe. It does both of these things by effectively 
sanctioning breaches of the right for Muslim women to manifest religion and 
contributing to a negative discourse which makes Muslim women targets for hate 
crimes.  
 
It is indeed ironic that women are treated less favourably through a rhetoric of 
equality and ‘women’s rights’ and it raises serious questions about the universality in 
the application of rights to Muslim women. There is a need to rethink frameworks 
which regard ‘equality’ as antithetical to ‘culture’ and incompatible with non-Western 
contexts. This is not to abandon a universal application of human rights: rather it is to 
‘respond to the debate by emphasising that all women have a universal right to the 
enjoyment of all human rights, although all women’s experiences, strategies and 
choices in affirming those rights need not be identical.’148  
 
Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International, argues that the most 
powerful tool against gender violence, intolerance, racism, xenophobia and terrorism 
is the universality of rights applied equally to men and women ‘universal in both 
understanding and application.’149 Ms Khan argues that: 
 
“The state has the obligation to safeguard a woman’s freedom of choice not restrict 
it. … It is wrong for women in Saudi Arabia or Iran to be compelled to put on the veil. 
It is equally wrong for women or girls in Turkey or France to be forbidden by law to 
wear the headscarf. … In the exercise of her right to freedom of expression and 
religion, a woman should be free to choose what to wear.” 
 
                                                 
148
  Kerr, above n. 12, 30 citing Charlotte Bunch.  
149
  Irene Khan, ‘Foreword to 2007 Amnesty International Annual Report’ Amnesty International 
Report 2007: The State of the Worlds Human Rights, 
http://archive.amnesty.org/report2007/document/231/default.htm , 8. At 20 October 2008. 
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In looking to use global systems and the benefits of mass communication and 
organisation to advance women’s rights, advocates need to take care to listen to the 
people whose rights they wish to support. The urge to a supposed universality which 
in fact obscures a ‘logic of assimilation’ and supports neo-imperialist globalising 
forces must be resisted.  In 1984, Chandra Mohanty stated that ‘One such significant 
effect of the dominant ‘representations’ of Western feminism is its conflation with 
imperialism …. Hence the urgent need to examine the political implications of 
analytic strategies and principles.’150 This imperative is arguably even more urgent in 
the current climate. ‘Orientalist’ perspectives are undoubtedly present in all areas of 
international law151 and jurisprudence on freedom of religion pays insufficient 
attention to them .152  While this article has focussed on the gendered problem of an 
orientalist perspective for women’s rights, it also raises wider concerns in relation to 
the right to be ‘other’ in Europe.  
 
 
                                                 
150
  Mohanty, above n 25, 336. 
151
  Youmans, above n 28; Allain, above n 28; Falk, above n 17.  
152
 Marshall, above n 5.   
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